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TARIFF LIMITATIONS ON AIR CARRIAGE CONTRACTS
By GEOFFREY N. PRATTt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS article is adapted from the third chapter of the author's thesis sub-
mitted to the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, in
partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Laws.
The main aim of the thesis was to consider the validity of clauses con-
tained in contracts of air carriage extending exclusion and limitation of
liability provisions in favour of the air carrier to his servants and agents.
The discussion of United States law contained in the thesis and reproduced
here primarily considers whether the carrier can validly limit and exclude
his own liability, first under the common law and secondly under the
tariff system created by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, now sub-
stantially reenacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Following the
conclusions to this section, there is a consideration of whether any limita-
tion on the carrier's liability may be extended to his servants and agents.
In considering the common law position, the discussion is confined to
common carriage.!
II. THE COMMON LAW
A. Surface Carriers
The general rule in most of the United States is that a common carrier
of goods and passengers can only limit and exclude its liability when that
limitation or exclusion is just and reasonable. It is not just and reasonable
for a common carrier to limit or exclude its responsibility for the negli-
gence of itself or its servants. The leading case on the subject is N.Y.
Central Railroad Co. v. Lockzwood' where a drover was negligently in-
jured while travelling with his cattle under a general contract exempting
the carrier from all responsibility. The Supreme Court held that the drover
was a passenger for hire4 and that a common carrier cannot exempt him-
self from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants, a
t LL.B. (Nottingham), LL.M. (McGill), lecturer, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill
University, Montreal.
1 For a discussion of whether the limitation provisions in the Warsaw Convention apply to a
carrier's servants and agents, see Pratt, Carriage by Air Act, 1952-Limitation of Air Carriers'
Liability-Whether Servants of Carrier also Protected, 1962 Can. B. Rev. 40.
a For the distinction between common and private carriers in air carriage and the degree of
care required of them, see Rhyne, Aviation Accident Law 45 (Wash. 1947).
a 17 Wall 357 (1873). Cf. earlier cases of N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6
Howard 344 (1848) (Agreement that goods were at all times exclusively at the risk of the shipper
held not to affect carrier's liability for the gross negligence of his servants and agents); York Mfg.
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 3 Wall 107 (1866) (Carrier may restrict or diminish its common law
liability by contract so long as it does not attempt to cover losses by negligence or misconduct).
4 Carrier may stipulate in a free railway pass that he will not be liable for the negligence of
himself or his servants. See Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904); Boering v.
Chesapeake Beach R.R. Co., 193 U.S. 442 (1904); Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S.
459 (1923); Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948). These four cases were cited in
Braughton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Kan. 1960) (Condition in deceased's
free pass relieving carrier from all liability arising out of common law negligence held valid.).
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rule which the, court said applied both to carriers of goods and carriers of
passengers for hire, and with special force to the latter.
Two fundamental reasons were given for the principle. They were
stated with clarity in Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co.5 where
a stipulation by the defendant that it would not be liable for the loss of
goods by fire was under consideration.
The foundation of the rule is, that it tends to the greater security of con-
signors, who always deal with such carriers at a disadvantage. It tends to
induce greater care and watchfulness in those to whom an owner intrusts his
goods, and by whom alone the needful care can be exercised. Any contract
that withdraws a motive for such care, or that makes a failure to bestow
upon the duty assumed, extreme vigilance and caution, more probable, takes
away the security of the consignors and makes common carriage more un-
reliable.'
The reason that the courts cannot allow a condition which might result
in an exercise of less care, is not convincing. It forgets that the carrier and
his servants have other, perhaps more compelling reasons for exercising the
greatest amount of care possible. Accidents, particularly in aviation, in-
variably cause grave injuries and often death to the employees of the
carrier together with extensive damage to equipment. This consideration
alone would. make any carrier or servant think twice before taking any
undue risk. Again, competition with other forms of transport ensures a
high degree of care on the part of the carrier; more accidents, less public
confidence and fewer passengers and consignors. The second reason, namely
that the law should prevent the carrier from taking advantage of its
superior bargaining position is perhaps less convincing today since rates
and tariffs are now under Government supervision and a condition will
not be imposed upon a defenceless passenger/shipper unless filed with and
thus subject to the approval or otherwise of the competent agency. Also,
that some conditions which limit liability for negligence are not un-
reasonable, is accepted by the Government since it has adhered to the
Warsaw Convention."
However this may be, it is clear that the common law rule is still very
much the law. In fact, the Supreme Court said in 1952 that, although
the general rule was fashioned by the courts, more than a century's use
had conferred upon it "the force and precision of a legislative enactment."'
There is, however, one so-called exception to it. In Hart v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co.' the plaintiff signed a contract agreeing on a valuation of
horses shipped and the freight rate was based on the condition that the
carrier assumed liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation even
593 U.S. 174 (1876).
'Cf. Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 440-41 (1889). "A carrier who
stipulates not to be bound to the exercise of care and diligence seeks to put off the essential duties
of his employment . . . .The carrier and his customers do not stand upon a footing of equality."
On September 22, 1961, the Federal Aviation Agency released a document inviting comments
on the relationship of the United States to the Hague Protocol amending the Warsaw Convention.
Two questions were posed: 1) whether or not the State Department should recommend that the
President withdraw the request to the Senate for advice and consent to the Hague Protocol;
2) whether or not the United States should withdraw from participation in the Warsaw Con-
vention by giving the required six months notice. Since the United States represents over 50%
of the world's air transport, such a horrendous move would be a serious blow to air transportation
the world over and would seriously affect the unifying value of the Warsaw Convention.
'United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 239 (1952).
9112 U.S. 331 (1884).
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for loss by his own negligence. In a suit brought because of injuries
negligently caused to the horses, the Supreme Court refused to allow evi-
dence that these were race horses of far greater value than that agreed
upon in the contract of carriage. The court agreed with the general rule
that a carrier cannot stipulate for exemption from the consequences of
his own negligence or that of his servants but said:
The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from liability for
negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the
measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond
in that value for negligence. The compensation for carriage is based on that
value. The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater."0
There is a qualification in that the shipper must have a freedom of choice
as to whether he will enter into such an agreement and some considera-
tion such as a lower rate must be given him for so doing." If this con-
dition is satisfied, then the shipper will be bound, even if there is a gross
disproportion between the actual value of the goods and the value stated
in the contract of carriage. 2
B. Air Carriers
Despite a number of pleas that the common law rule should not be
automatically applied to air carriage just because they happen to be com-
mon carriers, 3 four cases concerning wrongful death applied the rule
before 1938 and it is clear from two subsequent cases under the tariff
system that the rule would have been applied equally to the carriage of
goods and baggage.
In Allison v. Standard Air Lines, Inc.," a passenger had been killed in
a plane crash. In an action brought by the administrator of the deceased's
estate, the carrier pleaded, inter alia, a provision of the ticket which had
been signed by the decedent. By it, the aircraft company was to be held
liable only for proven negligence. The court said that the defendant was
a common carrier and could not contract out of his liability as such. That
is, a common carrier cannot, by a clause in a ticket, reduce the amount of
care required of him. This is not reasonable since it has the effect of
cutting down his liability for negligence.
The issuance of a ticket with provisions printed thereon such as have been
placed in evidence here does not change the relations of the parties to this
action."1
10 Id. at 440-1.
" See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1921). "... valuation agreements
have been sustained only on principles of estoppel, and in carefully restricted cases where choice of
rates was given .... This valuation rule . . . is . . . an exception to the common law rule
of liability of common carriers and the latter rule remains in full effect as to all cases not falling
within the scope of such exception." See generally 1110 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936).
12 See George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915). (Plaintiff recovered
$50 for lost automobiles whose actual value was $20,000).
"a See Allen, Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers, 2 J. Air L. & Com. 325
(1931), disagreeing with Greer, Civil Liability of an Aviator as Carrier of Goods and Passengers,
1 J. Air L. & Com. 241 (1930); Edmunds, Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts, 1 J. Air L. &
Com. 321 (1930). Cf. Rittenberg, Limitation of Airline Passenger Liability, 6 J. Air L. & Com.
365 (1935) and Buhler, Limitation of Air Carrier's Tort Liability and Related Insurance Coverage
-A Proposed Federal Air Passenger Act, 11 Air L. Rep. 262 (1940). See also, Patrinelis, Limitation
of Liability for Personal Injury by Air Carrier, 13 A.L.R.2d 337.
14 [1930] U.S. Av. Rep. 292 (S.D. Cal. 1930); aff'd 65 F.2d 668 [1931] U.S. Av. Rep.
92 (CA-9 1931) without reference to problem in question.
'5 [1930] U.S. Av. Rep. at 297.
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Despite this, however, the jury found in favour of the defendant.
In Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc.,'" the plaintiff's husband
was killed in an aircraft crash while travelling on a ticket with a clause
in it stating that the defendant was not a common carrier and an agree-
ment by the passenger, exempting the defendant from any liability for
injury to or death of the passenger, whether caused by the negligence of
the defendant or otherwise. In his charge to the jury, Kirkpatrick, D.J.
said at one point that:
No common carrier has a right to ask its passengers to relieve it of failure
on its part to perform the duty of care which the law requires of it. 7
Nor could the carrier escape liability by calling itself a private carrier.
In Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. v. Glose, s the clause in the ticket
of the deceased passenger provided "that in the event of the death of
injury of the holder due to any cause for which the Company is legally
liable, the Company's liability is limited to $10,000." The court citing,
inter alia, Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co." said that:
the policy of the law is settled that common carriers, in dealing with pas-
sengers, cannot compel them to so release their legal liability for their own
negligence."
The judge could see no reason "why the same principles applicable to
land and water should not also be applied to air transportation.""
Finally, in Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc.," the ticket of
the deceased traveller contained terms and conditions signed by the pas-
senger, limiting the liability of the carrier according to the price paid.
The passenger was given no choice between full and limited liability,
however, and the New York Court of Appeal held this to be fatal to
its validity since while exemption or limitation provisions are allowed by
the New York courts, a material element in the decisions had always
been that the passenger could choose between full or limited liability.
There was no question in the court's mind that the common law rule and
its New York modification applied to air carriage.
The two cases which indicate that the rule would be applied to the
carriage of baggage and goods by air are Siwalk v. Pennsylvania-Central
Airline Corp." and Randolph v. American Airlines Inc." In the former
case, the action was for damages to the baggage of an intra-state passenger
caused by the breaking of a bottle of toilet water through the negligence
of the defendant airline. The court held that the enumeration in the
interstate tariff on file with the Civil Aeronautics Authority of articles
not acceptable as baggage, did not include a reasonable amount of toilet
water. In the alternative, it was held that if the intrastate passenger was
'a [1931] U.S. Av. Rep. 205 (ED-Penn. 1931) (Not oflicially reported).
17 Id. at 213.
1866 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1933); cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1934).
"See supra note 5. The clause in this carriage of goods case excluded liability altogether.
20See supra note 18, at 712.
21 Ibid.
22 2 6 6 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935). Noted in 20 Cornell L.Q. 495 (1935).
23 [1941] U.S. Av. Rep. 66 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, 1940).
24 144 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1956). Discussions of the common law rule and
personal injuries can be found in Bernard v. U.S. Aircoach, 117 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1953)
and Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 240 N.C. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not subject to the interstate tariffs, she was entitled to recover under the
rule that a common carrier may not stipulate against liability for its
own negligence.
In Randolph v. American Airlines, considered more fully below, Fess,
J. referred to the general rule of law that "common carriers cannot stipu-
late for immunity from their own or their agents' negligence" and to the
distinction made at common law "between a contract immunizing a carrier
from liability for negligence and a contract limiting liability upon an
agreed valuation at a higher charge or rate." It is clear that he regarded
both rules as applicable to air carriers.
At common law, then, an air carrier transporting goods and passengers
for hire, cannot exclude or limit his liability for the negligence of himself
or of his servants and agents. In a contract for the carriage of goods or
baggage, however, he can limit his liability to a fixed valuation provided
the passenger or consignor has the choice of declaring a higher value and
paying an additional charge. How far and to what extent this common
law has been superceded or adopted in interstate carriage by the tariff
system has now to be considered.
III. THE TARIFF SYSTEM
A. The Civil Aeronautics Act, 193 82 As Reenacted In The
Federal Aviation Act, 1958,26 And The Economic
Regulations Of The Civil Aeronautics Board
The Civil Aeronautics Act was passed for substantially the same reasons
as the Interstate Commerce Act, 1887. It is influenced considerably by
the experience obtained under that Act which, with its subsequent amend-
ments, will accordingly be referred to from time to time for comparative
purposes. The 1887 Act regulated interstate railroad commerce and set
up the Interstate Commerce Commission to supervise this regulation. Sub-
sequently, shipping s and road21 transportation were added to the Com-
mission's field of jurisdiction. Congress thought, however, that a separate
agency was required to supervise the regulation of air commerce and so
it established the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)"2 by passing the Civil
Aeronautics Act in 1938. The main purposes of this legislation were to
prevent discrimination and to ensure uniformity in the treatment of
passengers and shippers, thus putting them more on a footing of equality
with the carriers whose superior bargaining power had hitherto been
imperfectly controlled by common law rules and statutes which varied
from state to state. The tariff system was to be the means by which these
purposes were to be effected.
The principal requirement of the Act is the filing, posting and pub-
lishing of tariffs. These tariffs are to be filed with the Civil Aeronautics
Board and are to show all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation
25 52 Stat. 973, as amended 49 U.S.C. 401-722 (1952).
26 Public Law 726, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
27 24 Stat. 379, 49 U.S.C.A. 1 etc., (Supp. 1947).
28 Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. 801-42.
21 Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C.A. 301-27.
25A complete statement of CAB's organization and functions may be found in Public Notice
No. 10 of the CAB issued January 1, 1956. Printed in full in Speiser, Preparation Manual for
Aviation Negligence Cases (New York, 1958) ch. 4.
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and, to the extent required by regulations, practices and services in con-
nection with such air transportation."' Strict observance of its tariffs is
required of the carrier, 2 and departure from the filed tariffs is made a
criminal offence. The tariffs may be changed only after thirty days
notice although the Board in the public interest, may allow a change
upon shorter notice. 4 It is the carrier's duty to establish just and reason-
able tariffss3 and discrimination resulting from their application is pro-
hibited." The Board is given limited judicial powers. It can suspend a
new tariff provision from going into effect if it believes the provision de-
parts from the requirements of the Act. This power is not applicable to
initial tariffs, however." Once a tariff provision has gone into effect, the
Board can, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, determine whether
it is or will be unjust, unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial and it can prescribe a lawful provision
to take its place if need be." The Board can also conduct investigations
31 § 403 (a). "Every carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the Board, and print,
and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation
between points served by it, and between points served by it and points served by any other air
carrier or foreign air carrier when through service and through rates shall have been established,
and showing to the extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations,
practices, and services in connection with such air transportation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted,
and published in such form and manner, and shall contain such information as the Board shall
by regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered to reject any tariff so filed which is not
consistent with this section and such regulations. Any tariff so rejected shall be void ....
32 § 403 (b). "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall charge or demand or collect or receive
a greater or lessor different compensation for air transportation or for any service in connection
therewith, than the rates, fares, and charges specified in its currently effective tariffs; and no air
carrier or foreign air carrier shall, in any manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or
through any agent or broker, or otherwise, refund or remit any portion of the rates, fares, or
charges so specified, or extend to any person any privileges or facilities, with respect to matters
required by the Board to be specified in such tariffs, except those specified therein .
335 902(a), (d).
§ 403 (c).
a§ 404(a). "It shall be the duty of every carrier to provide and furnish interstate and overseas
air transportation, as authorized by its certificate, upon reasonable request therefor and to provide
reasonable through service in such air transportation in connection with other air carriers; to
provide safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities in connection with such transportation;
to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates, fares and charges,
and just and reasonable classifications, rules, regulations and practices relating to such air transporta-
tion and, in case of such joint rates, fares, and charges, to establish just, reasonable, and equitable
divisions thereof as between air carriers participating therein which shall not unduly prefer or
prejudice any of such participating air carriers."
3'§ 404(b). "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic
in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality or
description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
37 1002(g). "Whenever any air carrier shall file with the Board a tariff stating a new in-
dividual or joint (between air carriers) rate, fare, or charge for interstate or overseas air transporta-
tion or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge, or the
value of the service thereunder, the Board is empowered, upon complaint or upon its own initiative,
at once, and, if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the air carrier, but upon
reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, or charge,
or such classification, rule, regulation, or practice; . . . after hearing, whether completed before
or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice goes into effect, the Board
may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding instituted after
such rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice had become effective . . . . Pro-
vided, that this subsection shall not apply to any initial tariff filed by any air carrier."
a § 1002 (d). "Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon its own initiative,
the Board shall be of the opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge demanded,
charged, collected or received by any carrier for interstate or overseas air transportation or any
classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge, or the value of the
service thereunder, is or will be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
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upon complaint or upon its own initiative, into any suspected violation
of the Act" and can compel any offender to comply therewith." One
other important and relevant section is section 1006 which accounts for
some of the confusion concerning the legal effect of the Act:
Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute but the provisions of this Act
are in addition to such remedies.
The CAB has made many regulations pursuant to the Act and those
which concern tariffs are contained in Parts 221-227 of the Economic
Regulations. Tariffs are to apply to persons or property but not to both,41
and the only contents allowed in tariffs are those prescribed by Parts
221.33-221.41. Part 221.38 (a) prescribes the contents of the rules tariffs.4"
It will be noticed that the provisions allowed are not defined specifically
but they must affect the rates, fares or charges for air transportation or
govern the terminal services or other services which the carrier performs
in connection with air transportation. As will be seen, the ambiguity
inherent in this part has given rise to conflicting court decisions. How-
ever in the sphere of personal liability, there can be no ambiguity since
Part 221.38(h), provides that tariff rules limiting or conditioning the
carrier's liability for personal injury or death will not be accepted from
March 2, 1954."2 Later in that year, the CAB issued an order requiring
carriers to cancel from their tariffs on or before January 1, 1955, all
rules, regulations or provisions stating any limitation on, or condition
relating to, carrier liability for personal injury or death."
Thus, a filed limitation of liability provision to be valid must first be
statutorily authorized. To satisfy this requirement, it must be a rule in
connection with air transportation and its filing must be required by the
Board's regulations. To satisfy these regulations, it must be a rule which
affects rates, fares or charges or which governs terminal services or other
services provided by the carrier. Limitation of liability for personal in-
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare
or charge (or the maximum or minimum, or the maximum and minimum thereof), thereafter
to be demanded, charged, collected, or received, or the lawful classification, rule, regulation or
practice thereafter to be made effective .3'§ 1002(a), (b).
40 § 1002(c).
41 Part 221.21(i).
42 "Rules & regulations: (a) Contents. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the rules and
regulations of each tariff shall contain:
(1) Such explanatory statements regarding the fares, rates, rules or other provisions
contained in the tariffs as may be necessary to remove doubt as to their application,
(2) All the terms, conditions or other provisions which affect the rates, fares or
charges for air transportation named in the tariff,
(3) All of the rates or charges for and the provisions governing terminal services
and all other services which the carrier undertakes or holds out to perform on, for,
or in connection with air transportation,
(4) All other provisions and charges which in any way increase or decrease the
amount to be paid on any shipment or by any passenger or by any charterer or which
in any way increase or decrease the value of the services rendered to the shipment
or passenger or charterer."
4s "Personal liaiblity rules. No provision of the Board's regulations issued under this part
or elsewhere shall be construed to require on or after March 2, 1954, the filing of any tariff rules
stating any limitation on, or condition relating to, the carrier's liability for personal injury or death.
No subsequent regulation issued by the Board shall be construed to supersede or modify this rule
of construction except to the extent that such regulation shall do so in express terms."
"Order Serial No. E-8756, 19 Fed, Reg. 7387 (1954).
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juries or death is expressly disallowed. If it can be shown that a limitation
provision is statutorily authorized, it then has to face the test of reason-
ableness. Several problems arise when the validity of a tariff is being tested
in this way but, before considering them, the legal effect of properly filed
tariffs will be briefly stated.
B. The Effect Of Properly Filed Tariffs
Valid tariffs become a part of the contract of carriage and, as such,
are binding on all parties irrespective of actual knowledge. Any con-
tractual provisions or agreements inconsistent with them, are void."' These
principles were established by the Supreme Court when called upon to
construe the effect of tariffs filed, posted and published pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Act. They have been applied without dissent as the
effect of tariffs on file with the CAB, most reliance being placed upon
the Supreme Court decisions in Boston d M.R. Co. v. Hoo ser' and
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. d Co."
In the former case, the tariff in question contained a limitation as to
baggage liability based upon the requirement to declare its value when
more than $100 and pay an excess charge. The passenger had no actual
notice of the tariff and no inquiry was made as to the value of his baggage
upon acceptance. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held him bound by it,
a Massachusetts common law rule to the contrary, not withstanding.
... the effect of filing schedules and rates with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was to make the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier
alike, thus making effectual the purpose of the act, to have but one rate,
open to all alike and from which there could be no departure. s
The reasons why the defendant is bound by the tariff, whether or not he
had knowledge of it, were clearly stated in the Esteve case where a tariff
limited the telegraph company's liability for mistake in the transmission
of unrepeated cablegrams to the amount of the company's share of the
tolls collected. The tariff offered alternative rates for repeated and un-
repeated cable messages. It was said:
The rule does not rest upon the fiction of constructive notice. It flows
from the requirement of equality and uniformity of rates laid down in § 3
of the Interstate Commerce Act. Since any deviation from the lawful rate
would involve either an undue preference or an unjust discrimination, a rate
lawfully established must apply equally to all, whether there is knowledge
of it or not.4"
For the same reasons, any agreement which is inconsistent with the
tariffs, is void. Thus, in one case, a lower rate than that filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission was quoted to a consignor who shipped
"' For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these principles, see Markham & Blair, The Effect
of Tariff Provisions Filed under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. Air L. & Com. 251 (1948).
40 233 U.S. 97 (1914).
47256 U.S. 566 (1921).
48233 U.S. at 112. (Actual value of baggage was $2,000.)
48 256 U.S. at 573. See also American Express Co. v. U.S. Horseshoe Co., 244 U.S. 58 (1917)
(Contract may not be avoided, where it is valid from the point of view of the established rate
sheets on file with the I.C.C. by the suggestion that by neglect or inattention, the contract was
not read by the shipper); American Ry. Express Co. v. Daniel, 269 U.S. 40 (1925) (Carrier knew
that a servant of the plaintiff was unaware of a package's value and did not know that lower
values secure lower rates. Nevertheless carrier's liability was limited.)
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goods under that lower rate. The Supreme Court held that the consignor
must pay the full rate as stated in the tariffs." Similarily, it was held
that a shipper could not recover damages for the breach of an agreement
by which the carrier had agreed to expedite a shipment of horses over its
own lines so that it would reach the point of connection with the next
carrier in time to be carried by a special, fast, stock train the next
morning. This was an undue and unreasonable preference forbidden by
the Interstate Commerce Act since the shipper was only charged the
regular established joint through rates, which made no provision for such
service. The shipper did not know this.51
The courts have found no difficulty in applying these rules to tariffs
filed under the Civil Aeronautics Act. In Jones v. Northwest Airlines,52
the applicable tariff permitted the carrier to cancel any flight at any time
it deemed necessary and declared the carrier not responsible for failure of
the aircraft to depart or arrive on the scheduled time. The plaintiff con-
tended that he had a special contract with the carrier in which the limited
time he had for making the trip, was provided for. The Washington
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that his ticket was sold subject to tariff
regulations with which he was charged with notice and that since the
alleged specific contract was inconsistent with the terms of the tariff
schedules, it was void.
In buying this ticket, the appellant bought it subject to the regulations.
The respondent could not sell it on any other basis without violating the law,
for § 403 of the Civil Aeronautics Act . . . requires the filing of these rules
and regulations and forbids a carrier from departing therefrom."
This case together with the district court decision in Mack v. Eastern
Air Lines" where it was held, inter alia, that the plaintiff was bound by
the conditions specified in a similar tariff whose rules had become a part
of the contract between the carrier and the passenger, has been followed
on numerous occasions as indicating the legal effect of tariffs properly
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board."
"o Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242 (1906).
" Chicago & Atl. R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912). Cf. So. R.R. Co. v. Prescott, 240
U.S. 632 (1916). "It is .. .clear that with respect to the service governed by the Federal statute,
the parties were not at liberty to alter the terms of the service as fixed by the filed regulations."
See also Davis v. Cornwall, 264 U.S. 560 (1924).
5222 Wash. 2d 863, 157 P.2d 728 (1945).
'322 Wash. 2d 863, 864, 157 P.2d 728, 729 (1945).
54 87 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Mass. 1949).
" See and cf. Wilhelmy v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949);
Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). ("To the extent that these rules
are valid, they become a part of the contract under which the appellant and her baggage were
carried:" Judges Chase and Frank, who dissented, did not disagree with this proposition); Furrow
& Co. v. American Air Lines, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 808 (DC-Okla. 1952); Wittenberg v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 459 (DC-S.C. 1954) (Promise by ticket agent to plaintiff that a
connection would be made in time, held invalid and unenforceable since it was inconsistent with
tariff rule providing that carrier is not liable for failure to operate a flight on schedule); Wadel
v. American Air Lines, Inc., 269 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); S. Toepfer, Inc. v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 671 (DC-Okla. 1955); Wilkes v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 288 P.2d
377 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1955); Trammell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 75 (DC-S.C. 1955);
Rosch v. United Air Lines, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 266 (DC-N.Y. 1956); Clinical Supply Corp. v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 18,139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956); Randolph v. American Airlines,
Inc., 144 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); N.Y. & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Riddle
Airlines, Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 2d 1957), aff'd 172 N.Y.S.2d 168, 149 N.E.2d 93
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1953); Killian v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 17 (DC-Wyo. 1957);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Krotke, 363 P.2d 94 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1961) (Failure to introduce tariff
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C. The Validity Of Tariffs
It is intended to discuss many of the cases which have had something
to say about a tariff's validity. These cases will be grouped according to
the tariff rule under consideration. To prevent confusion, however, it is
proposed to declare now instead of in conclusion, the method by which
it is thought a tariff's validity is to be tested by the courts. Any modifi-
cations to or deviations from this method will be noted in the course of
the discussion.
There are two questions to be kept in mind. First, who has jurisdiction
to determine the validity of a tariff on file with the Civil Aeronautics
Board? Second, what law applies to determine the validity of a tariff
on file with the CAB?
It is clear that the courts of law have jurisdiction to decide whether a
filed tariff is authorized or required to be filed by the Civil Aeronautics
Act and the CAB regulations and whether that tariff has been violated.
A more difficult question is whether the courts have jurisdiction to declare
a tariff invalid if it is statutorily authorized. Despite some judicial and
juristic opinion to the contrary, it will be submitted that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine as explained below and as interpreted by the ma-
jority judicial opinion to date, gives primary jurisdiction to the Civil
Aeronautics Board to decide whether or not a tariff has been, is, or will
be unreasonable, unjust, unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential or un-
duly prejudicial and that these are the only grounds upon which the validity
of a tariff may be attacked once it is shown to be statutorily authorized.
Until the CAB has declared a tariff invalid on one of the above grounds,
its approval of the tariff is presumed.
Federal law, that is, the Civil Aeronautics Act and regulations made
pursuant thereto by the CAB, has been applied by the courts to determine
the validity of a tariff. If the Act or the CAB regulations do not require
the filing of a particular tariff, state law applies.
These are the conclusions. There now follows a discussion of the au-
thorities from which these conclusions are drawn.
1. Cancellation of Flights
In Adler v. Chicago &q Southern Air Lines,56 the plaintiff sought to
recover damages suffered by him as a result of the defendant's cancella-
tion of a flight and for its failure to make other arrangements for his
transportation to St. Louis. The defendant moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted all of his remedies before
the CAB. The court briefly discussed the primary jurisdiction doctrine
as it had been applied under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Ship-
ping Act, 1916 and finding that the Civil Aeronautics Act was not dis-
similar in its purpose and scope from these two Acts, applied the doctrine
to the case before them. Since it was apparent that the practice of can-
celling scheduled flights was a 'practice' within the meaning of the Act,
regulations in evidence held fatal to passengers claim, since it precluded a determination by the
court of the terms and conditions of the contract of carriage of which they formed a part); Slick
Airways, Inc. v. U.S., 292 F.2d 515 (U.S. Ct. CI. 1961) (Air carrier was entitled to an increased
rate after it had filed a new tariff and although it continued to receive the old rate due to a
clerical error in billing); Rosen Chein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 349 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961).
5'41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
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it following that the reasonableness or lawfulness of such practice could
only be determined by the CAB and,
this court is without jurisdiction to grant any relief to the plaintiff in the
absence of a finding by that Board that the practice complained of is unlaw-
ful or unreasonable, and until the plaintiff is able to allege in a complaint
that he has exhausted all of his remedies before that Board. 7
The application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the tariff system
under the Civil Aeronautics Act was severely criticized at the time," but
although this criticism has been approved judicially once or twice, it has
had little effect in practice. The doctrine9 was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Texas E P.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co."0 where
the plaintiff was attempting to obtain relief from an alleged unreasonable
freight rate exacted from him for an interstate shipment. The Court held
that no relief could be obtained without reference to any previous action
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. A major factor in the decision
was the power granted to the Commission by the Interstate Commerce
Act to hear legal complaints of and award reparations to individuals for
wrongs unlawfully suffered from the past application of an unreasonable
rate. The continued existence of a similar power in the courts would be
absolutely inconsistent with these provisions of the statute, notwithstand-
ing article 22 which provides that nothing contained in the Act shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute but the provisions of the Act are in addition to such remedies."5
The court also argued that
if without previous action by the Commission, power might be exerted by
courts and juries generally to determine the reasonableness of an established
rate, it would follow that . . . a uniform standard of rates in the future
would be impossible."5
Later the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co."
that the doctrine applied to cases involving rates attacked for being un-
justly discriminatory. If the courts were to take jurisdiction in the absence
of an investigation and order by the ICC, this
would be in derogation of the power expressly delegated to the Commission
and would be destructive of the uniformity and equality which the act was
designed to secure."'
In Northern P. R. Co. v. Solum5 the doctrine was held to apply to "any
practice of the carrier which gives rise to the application of a rate.""
Impressed with the similarity between the Interstate Commerce Act
17 Id. at 367.
"SSee e.g. Barnhard, Primary Jurisdiction and Administrative Remedies, 30 Geo. L.J. 545
(1942); Markham & Blair, supra note 45, at 281; King, The Effect of Tariff Provisions: Some
Further Observations, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 174, 183 (1949).5 See generally, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1938).
60204 U.S. 426 (1907).
6" Cf. Civil Aeronautics Act, § 1106.
62 204 U.S. at 440.
63222 U.S. 506 (1912).
4Id. at 510.
65247 U.S. 477 (1918).
6'Id. at 483. See also Director General of Railroads v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498 (1921).
(I.C.C. had initial jurisdiction over contention that an amendment to a freight rate by which silk
was included among the articles that would not be accepted for freight, was invalid.)
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and the Shipping Act of 1916, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in
applying the doctrine to the practices of steamship companies in U.S.
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.'
The main criticism of the application of the doctrine to interstate
aviation is that unlike the ICC, the CAB has no power to grant repara-
tions for the past application of an unreasonable tariff. Indeed, it has no
power to pass upon the validity of a tariff retroactively at all. It can only
determine whether a tariff "is or will be unjust . . . ."" Thus, an agency
which has no jurisdiction to make retroactive declarations of validity,
cannot have primary jurisdiction to do so.
Another criticism admits the application of the doctrine to aviation but
attempts to limit it to rates and technical regulations with which the
CAB has the know-how and competence to deal. The validity of legal
regulations relating to, for example, limitations on liability, should be a
question for the courts whose judges have the experience of centuries to
call upon.
Following the Adler decision, the CAB held that the the tariff concerned
was not unreasonable, thus clearly implying that they did have the power
to make retrospective declarations of validity and on matters which might
be thought peculiarly within the cognisance of the judiciary."' The sub-
sequent history of the doctrine and the CAB will show that, regrettable
as it may seem to some writers, this is the present situation.
In the Jones case, discussed above,7 ° the court agreed with the Adler
decision that where a party attempts to show the unreasonableness of a
regulation, he must do so before the CAB, rather than before the state or
federal courts, because, otherwise uniformity of practices would be im-
possible but, where the carrier is in breach of its contract of carriage by
violating its own rates, rules, etc., on file with the CAB, it is not necessary
to refer the matter to the CAB "because there is no technical fact to be
determined." A state or federal court has jurisdiction in such cases.
This distinction helps to explain Schwartzman v. United Air Lines, 1
where the plaintiff sued to recover alleged damages for the failure and
refusal of the defendant to transport him as passenger by aircraft and to
secure the return of the price paid by him for the ticket. A motion to
strike the first count was filed by the defendant, the main ground being
the statutory vesting of primary jurisdiction in the CAB. The district
court held that the sole object of the court was the recommendation of
a sum of money for breach of contract and that, since the petition did
not assail or question the validity of any administrative regulation, the
CAB had no primary jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The decision
was based on the distinction clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in
Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.7
... for doing an act prohibited by the statute, the injured party must sue
the carrier without preliminary action by the Commission, because the courts
could apply the law prohibiting a departure from the tariff to the facts of
6'284 U.S. 474 (1932).
68§ 1002(d); supra note 38.
69 Adler v. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 4 CAB 113 (1943).
70 Supra note 52.
7' 6 F.R.D. $17 (DC-Neb. 1947). Cf. CAB v. Modern Air Transport, 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
195o).
72230 U.S. 247 (1914).
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the case. But where the suit is based upon unreasonable charges or unreasonable
practices, there is no law fixing what is unreasonable and therefore pro-
hibited. In such cases ... the Commission and not the courts should pass upon
that administrative question.
In Mack v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,73 the plaintiff was a passenger in a
plane from Boston to Washington but his flight was cancelled on arrival
in New York because of bad weather conditions. He based his suit on
three causes of action: (1) in tort, in that the defendant had negligently
failed to warn him that the flight might not be completed; (2) in tort
again, in that the plaintiff negligently failed to complete the flight to
Washington; and (3) in contract alleging breach of contract to fly him
to Washington. The relevant tariffs declared that the carrier would not
be liable for failing to operate any flight according to schedule or for
changing schedule with or without notice to the passenger and also pro-
vided for no liability for the removal of a passenger by reason of weather
or other conditions beyond the carrier's control. The tariff itself specified
that its rules were included as terms and conditions of the contract of
carriage.
The District Court of Massachusetts thought there could be "no ques-
tion that these rules were within the authority conferred by the Civil
Aeronautics Act 1938 and became a part of the contract between the
carrier and passenger."7 Section 1106 of the Act was cited by the plaintiff
but the court said that this section only preserved pre-existing common
law remedies and not pre-existing obligations or contractual arrangements.
Contractual arrangements and obligations are governed by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act and not by common law or some other statute."'
Then the court said that if the Scbwartzman case was to the contrary,
they declined to follow it. It is thought that there is no conflict between
the two cases, however, since the court in Scbwartzman was concerned
with the question of jurisdiction whereas, in the Mack case, the court
concerned itself with the problem of the law applicable. Another way of
putting it is that the problem in Schwartzman was, did the court have
jurisdiction to determine whether or not there had been a breach of con-
tractual obligations? The problem in Mack was, what law is applicable to
determine the effect of a breach of contractual obligations?
Scbwartzman was again mentioned in Wittenberg v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc."6 where it was held, inter alia, that tariff rules providing that an air
carrier is not liable for failure to operate a flight according to schedule are
a complete bar to a passenger suing for damages for the failure of the
carrier to provide flight connections. Since he alleged a tort on the part
of the defendant, the plaintiff had argued that the tariffs and contract
conditions were not applicable. The court thought that, on the facts, he
had established no tortious conduct and distinguished Scbwartzman on
its facts by saying that there the plaintiff could conceivably within the
scope of the petition, have adduced evidence establishing a cause of action.
This interpretation would indicate that common law is still applicable
73 Supra note 54.
74 Supra note 54, at 116.
75 Ibid.
76 126 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. S.C. 1954). See also supra note 55.
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when actions are brought which do not conflict with the Civil Aero-
nautics Act and the rules established by the courts to ensure the effective-
ness of the tariff system as established by that Act. Thus, if a tariff does
not cover the problem in issue as, for example, where tortious conduct
is shown which is independent of any tariff or about which the tariff
says nothing, then common law will be applied to determine it. Mack, is
not inconsistent with this principle although it was there said that section
1106 does not preserve pre-existing common law obligations. This must be
understood to mean that pre-existing obligations in conflict with those
established under the Act, are not preserved. If Mack is understood in
this way, it is submitted that whichever way it is interpreted, Schvartz-
man is not out of line with either Mack or Wittenberg."
In Trammell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.," an attack was made on the
validity of a tariff allowing a carrier to cancel reservations for failure on
the passenger's part to reconfirm a reservation. Citing, inter alia, Jones
and Mack, the district court had no difficulty in declaring it was author-
ized and that its reasonableness could only be raised in court after exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies before the CAB.
These are the cases which deal with the validity of cancellation of flight
and similar provisions in airline tariffs on file with the CAB. They hold
that the provisions are statutorily authorized and the CAB has held them
not unreasonable. They imply that the courts have jurisdiction to determine
whether a tariff is statutorily authorized and whether a tariff has been
violated. They hold that the CAB has primary jurisdiction as to whether
or not the tariffs are reasonable. They hold that the law governing con-
tractual arrangements to which the tariffs refer, is federal law, i.e., the
Civil Aeronautics Act and not the federal common law. They imply that
common law applies to matters not within the scope of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act.
2. Time of Delivery of Freight
In Furrow & Co. v. American Airlines, Inc.,"5 a cargo of flowers was
damaged because of the time involved in shipment. They were damaged to
such an extent as to be unmarketable at the time of delivery. The court
found that the flowers had been delivered without unreasonable delay
and in compliance with the contract of carriage, pointing to the carrier's
freight tariffs which provided that the carrier had no obligation to com-
mence or complete transportation within a certain time or according to
schedule. "Such rules are within the authority conferred by the Civil
Aeronautics Act and the tariffs involved become a part of the contract
of transportation." The Court added that, under the 'primary jurisdic-
tion' doctrine, an attack upon the alleged unreasonableness of the pro-
visions of any tariff filed with the CAB, must be made to the Board in
the first instance.
The same tariff provision was construed by the New York City court in
Goldsamt v. Slick Airways, Inc.s° not to mean that the defendant was
"Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 7 Av. Cas. 17,997 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). "The
conclusion that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 does not exclude consistent state law, or alter
existing state remedies under state law, seems to be strengthened by the words of the savings
clause of that Act. ... Referring to § 1106.
78 136 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. S.C. 1955).
79 102 F. Supp. 808 (W.D. Okla. 1952).
'04 Av. Cas. 17,386 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
free of liability for failure to perform its contractual obligation to deliver
the merchandise within a reasonable time. The court thought that the
tariff did not exempt the defendant from liability for negligence since
there was no specific reference made in it to non-liability for negligence.
• * , and the language of the tariff will not be broadened by implication to
include an exemption not covered by specific stipulation.
The motions of the parties for summary judgment were denied because
the question of the reasonableness of the time to make delivery was a
question of fact which required investigation and evaluation of testi-
mony. It will be noted that there is no conflict with the 'primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine' in this case, since the court took jurisdiction to consider
the scope and extent and not the reasonableness of the tariff in question.
The tariff was considered again in Killian v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,"
where the plaintiff sued to recover the money he had expended in making
alternative arrangements for the shipment of a cargo of flowers which had
been off-loaded en route in order to bring the plane within prescribed
weight limits. The tariff also provided that the cargo was subject to delay
or embargo by reason of any governmental rules, regulations or orders or
other conditions beyond the control of the carrier. The court held that
the rules are within the authority conferred by the Civil Aeronautics
Act and that, in view of the 'primary jurisdiction' doctrine, they are
deemed to be approved by the CAB and not in conflict with any pro-
visions of the Act. The judge also said that he was not here dealing with
the common law rule that a common carrier cannot contract itself out
of liability for its own negligence but with special rules authorized by
Congress when it created the CAB and empowered it to issue rules, regu-
lations and tariffs and apply them to this type of common carrier.
It is thought that the two latter cases, clearly presuppose the possibility
of a valid tariff provision limiting or excluding liability for negligence.
In Riddle Airlines, Inc. v. Famous Cottons, Inc.," it was held, inter alia,
that an air carrier is not liable to a shipper where cargo is delayed and the
carrier's tariff states that it will not be liable for loss or delay unless caused
by the carrier's negligence.
A similar tariff provision was considered in Modern Wholesale Florist
v. Braniff International Airways, Inc." where an action was brought for
a damaged shipment of flowers. The tariff excluded the carrier's liability
"for loss, damage, deterioration, destruction, theft, delay, default, mis-
delivery, non-delivery or any other result not caused by the actual negli-
gence of itself, its agent, servant or representative .. . ." The court reversed
a summary judgment in favour of the carrier and held that this tariff did
not operate to prevent the plaintiff from relying upon the common law
presumption that the damage was caused while the shipment was in the
custody of the carrier, the burden of proof being upon him to disprove
negligence. There was no conflict here between the tariff and the common
law rule of adjective law which relates to the manner and method of proof.
81150 F. Supp. 17 (D. Wyo. 1957).
825 Av. Cas. 18,049 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958). See also supra note 55.
'a162 Tex. 594, 350 S.W.2d 539 (1961).
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We would be loath to say that the presumption did not obtain in the absence
of a clear and unequivocal statement to that effect contained in a tariff rule
adopted in accordance with statutory authority. 4
Here, then, is another example of the interrelationship between the com-
mon law and the federal law, as laid down in the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Where the Act or regulations made under the Act, are silent or not in
conflict with the common law, common law applies.
Thus these cases hold that the tariffs therein concerned are statutorily
authorized. They hold that the CAB has primary jurisdiction to consider
their reasonableness which will be presumed until it does so. They hold
that the courts have jurisdiction to consider the scope and extent of a tariff
provision. They imply that common law applies if the Civil Aeronautics
Act or regulations made thereunder are silent or are not in conflict with
the common law.
3. Disclaimer of Liability for the Loss of Certain Types of Baggage
Perhaps the most important case yet decided on the question of a
tariff's validity is the decision of the federal court of appeals for the
second circuit in Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.8" The appellant had
checked two pieces of baggage before boarding the aircraft which took her
from Miami to Philadelphia. On arrival, one of the bags was delivered to
her but the other was mistakenly carried on to Newark where it was
handed to an unknown person without the surrender of a baggage check.
Later the bag was returned to the carrier but, on examination by the
appellant, three articles of jewelry valued at over $3,000 were found to
be missing. The appellant sued. In defence, the carrier relied upon rules
contained in a tariff on file with the CAB. They provided that jewelry
"will be carried only at the risk of the passenger" and that the carrier
will not be liable for the loss of jewelry.
It was clear to the court that "to the extent that these rules are valid,
they become a part of the contract under which the appellant and her
baggage were carried." The question then was one of validity. Com-
menting, that under the Civil Aeronautics Act and the 'primary jurisdic-
tion' doctrine, the provisions of a tariff properly filed with the CAB
and within its authority are deemed valid until rejected by it, the court
said that, if the Act was to be interpreted as investing the Board with
power to approve and accept the tariff in issue, the reasonableness of the
rule could be raised in court only after the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The appellant had argued that the Act should not be construed to allow
the Board to modify the common law rule that a common carrier may not
by contract relieve itself from liability for the consequences of its own
negligence and that accordingly the common law rule still applied and
invalidated these exculpatory provisions. The court could not agree. Bear-
ing in mind the primary purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act to assure
uniformity of rates and services to all persons, the court said that the
broad regulatory scheme set up by the Act and not the common law must
govern the contract of the parties. The court noted that, although the
Interstate Commerce Act is similar to the Civil Aeronautics Act, a later
84 162 Tex. at 597.
'5 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
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amendment to it contains an express provision prohibiting exemption from
liability for any loss or damage to baggage caused by the carrier."s It
followed, therefore, that:
The absence of a similar provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act compels the
conclusion that such an exemption is not forbidden to air carriers and that
the Board could properly accept the appellee's tariff.8 7
This decision is somewhat surprising in view of the principle many times
referred to and approved by the Supreme Court that
No statute is to be construed as altering the common law further than its
words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the
common law which it does not fairly express.88
In fact, Judge Frank in a forceful dissenting judgment, disagreed entirely
with the proposition that because the Civil Aeronautics Act did not ex-
pressly disallow tariffs excluding liability for negligence, such a tariff was
authorized. Where the Act is silent, then federal common law or state
law, as the case may be, applies and since the federal common law declares
invalid any disclaimer of liability for negligence, the tariff in question is
invalid and the Board had no authority to approve it. He cited the
Supreme Court decision in Adams Express Co. v. Croningers8 in support
of his argument.
In that case, the court considered the validity of a tariff on file with
the Interstate Commerce Commission which limited the liability of the
carrier for loss or damage of goods to an agreed or declared value. The
defendant argued that the provisions of a Kentucky state law nullified
such a condition in a contract of carriage. The court held, however, that
the Carmack Amendment of 1906 which allowed a limitation of liability
according to value but disallowed a complete exclusion of liability, and
not the state law governed interstate commerce contracts of carriage. How-
ever, the Supreme Court pointed out that where a similar case arose in
a state court after the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act but
before the Carmack Amendment, state law would be applied because there
was no federal legislation on the subject of exculpatory provisions.
Prior to amendment the rule of carrier's liability for an interstate shipment
of property, as enforced in both Federal and State courts, was either that of
the general common law as declared by this court and enforced in the Federal
courts throughout the United States, Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.;"' or that
determined by the public policy of a particular State, Pennsylvania R.R. Co.
v. Hughes;"' or that prescribed by statute law of a particular State, Chicago,
88 The Carmack Amendment, 1906. 34 Stat. 593.
87 Supra note 85, at 942.
88Shaw v. Merchants' National Bank of St. Louis, 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). Cf. Texas &
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907) (... "a statute will not be con-
strued as taking away a common law right existing at the date of its enactment unless that result is
imperatively required, that is to say, unless it be found that the pre-existing right is so repugnant
to the statute that the survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its
efficacy; in other words render its provision nugatory.") See also Krawill Mach. Corp. v. Herd,
359 U.S. 297 (1959).
"s226 U.S. 491 (1913).
go 112 U.S. 331 (1884). See supra note 9.
01 191 U.S. 477 (1903). (Common law of Pennsylvania invalidating limitations of liability
to an agreed value applied. This law was not "an unlawful attempt to regulate interstate commerce,
in the absence of Congressional action providing a different measure of liability, when contracts
such as the one now before us are made in relation to interstate carriage.")
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M. eg St. P.R. Co. v. Solan.92 Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability
exemption from liability for negligence is against public policy and void.'
was possible until Congress should deal with the subject."
But now Congress had dealt with the subject and
The exemption forbidden is . . . 'a statutory declaration that a contract of
exemption from liability for negligence is against public policy and void.'
This is no more than this court as well as other courts administering the same
general common law, have many times declared. 4
Judge Frank argued that the Croninger case clearly showed the purpose
of the amendment to be the substitution of the general Federal common
law rule for the series of State statutes and decisions on the subject. Thus
even before the Carmack Amendment, the ICC could not have legalized a
tariff provision exempting a carrier from liability for its own negligence.
He then said the position under the Civil Aeronautics Act must be
the same as the position before the enactment of the Carmack Amend-
ment, since
it is inconceivable that Congress intended, merely by remaining silent, to
authorize the Board to adopt a policy flatly at odds with the hitherto uniform
Federal policy.9"
He conceded, however, that the defendant "with the Board's acquiescence,
might have provided in its tariff (a) perhaps that it would not carry
jewelry at all or (b) possibly, that its liability for any and all items con-
tained in passengers' baggage would be limited to a certain, reasonable
amount, unless the passenger gave notice of the presence of valuables in
his baggage and paid an additional sum for its transportation.'
'6
Since he had decided that the tariff was not statutorily authorized, and
that, therefore, the Board had exceeded its statutory power by accepting
it, it followed that the 'primary jurisdiction' doctrine had no application.
The plaintiff could proceed directly in court. In support of this proposi-
tion he cited, inter alia, the Supreme Court case of Boston & M. R. Co.
v. Piper' where it was said of a tariff rule which limited liability for
negligence without a corresponding choice of rates:
While this provision was in the bill of lading, the form of which was filed
with the Railroad Company's tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, it gains nothing from that fact. The legal conditions and limitations in
the carrier's bill of lading duly filed with the Commission are binding until
changed by that body; but not so of conditions and limitations which are, as
this one, illegal, and consequently void."
He then went even further by suggesting that, even if the case involved
only the reasonableness of the tariff provision, it might not be a proper
92 169 U.S. 128 (1898). (Iowa statute operated to make void a contract of carriage of cattle
which limited liability of carrier to $500 in any event. Held that State laws regulating exemptions
from liability do not violate commerce power. "So long as Congress has not legislated upon the
subject, they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a rightful
exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons
and corporations within its limits.")
9 226 U.S. at 504.
941d. at 511.
95 Supra note 8 , at 944.
" Supra note 85, at 945.
9'246 U.S. 439 (1918).
9"246 U.S. at 445.
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one for advance administrative determination. For the CAB has no power
to grant reparations and were the plaintiff to complain, the Board could
do no more than order the defendant to discontinue the use of the
exemption provision. His suggestion seemed to him particularly justified
where, as in this case, no administrative skill or wisdom is needed to
ascertain the reasonableness of the exculpatory provision. Also an applica-
tion of the doctrine would result in the "exhaustion of litigants," a "de-
laying formalism" and "idle form" which is contrary to the ancient
principle that every citizen ought to obtain "justice promptly and with-
out delay."
Apart from these doubts, the basic difference between the majority
and Judge Frank was as to the law applicable to determine the validity of
tariffs. The majority said, as did the Court in Mack v. Eastern Air Lines,99
that obligations and arrangements arising from the contract of carriage
must be governed by the broad regulatory scheme set up by the Civil
Aeronautics Act. It will be noted that this is a far wider proposition than
was actually necessary for the decision since it means that federal com-
mon law and state law have no place not only in actions attacking the
validity of tariffs but also in any action based on a contract of interstate
air carriage. In view of some of the decisions already discussed, 00 others to
be discussed, and more particularly in view of the Supreme Court de-
cisions cited in Judge Frank's opinion, it is submitted that the principle
must be narrowed to mean that the common law or state law does not
govern the contract only if they are inconsistent with the rules and regula-
tions prescribed by the provisions of the Act. 0 ' The majority view can
be explained, therefore, by saying that the common law rule invalidating
disclaimers of liability for negligence was inconsistent with the statute,
whereas Judge Frank was of an opposing opinion.
4. Requirement of Notice of Claim and Commencement of Action Within
a Certain Time
Perhaps the most controversial tariff provision to date has been the one
which typically provides that no action can be maintained for death,
personal injury, loss of or damage to baggage or goods unless written
notice of the claim is presented to the carrier within a specified period,
usually from thirty to ninety days and unless an action is commenced
within a certain time, usually one year, following the event giving rise
to the claim and action."2
Two decisions concerning the validity of similar provisions filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission have been regularly cited in the
aviation cases on the subject.
In Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.,' a clause in a drover's pass re-
99 Supra note 75.
"o' Cf. Schwartzmann v. United Air Lines, supra note 71 and Wittenberg v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., supra note 76, and Modern Wholesale Florist v. Braniff, supra note 83. These cases were not
concerned with the validity of the tariffs in evidence.
101 Cf. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507. See also Southeastern Aviation Inc.
v. Hurd, supra note 77.
.. There is an abundance of literature dealing with tariffs of this nature. See Kahn,
Limitation of Passenger Liability through Air Tariffs, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 482 (1949); McKay,
Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal Injuries, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 160
(1950); Plunket, Validity of Provisions in Airline Rules Tariffs, 9 Sw. L.J. 258, 268 (1953);
Saks, Air Carriers-Tariff Limitations as a Bar to Personal Injury Suits, 9 Miami L.Q. 326 (1955).
1'°258 U.S. 22 (1922).
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quired a would-be claimant for personal injuries to give notice of his
claim in writing to the general manager of the carrier within thirty days
of the injury. The Supreme Court, by a majority had little doubt that
this was valid. Although such a clause is just as effective to exclude the
carrier's liability for his own negligence as a clause expressly excluding
liability for negligence, the court said the two stipulations stand on a
different footing, the one being 'regulation,' the other being 'exoneration.'
The real issue for which they had granted the writ of certiorari was
whether the Cummins Amendment of March 4, 1915 104 which prohibited
railway carriers from fixing less than ninety days for giving notice of
claims in respect of goods, had established a public policy that would
invalidate the stipulation in issue.
The decisions we have cited show that the time would have been sufficient
but for the statute in respect of damage to goods and the reasons are stronger
to uphold it as adequate for personal injuries. A record is kept of goods yet,
even as to them, reasonably prompt notice is neccessary as a check upon
fraud. There is no record of passengers, and the practice of fraud is too com-
mon to be ignored. Less time reasonably may be allowed for notice of claims
for personal injuries than is deemed proper for goods, although very probably
an exception might be implied if the accident made notice within the time
impracticable. o0
The statute could not be taken to indicate a different view. On the con-
trary, the court said, Congress must have thought of claims for personal
injuries and, as it passed them by, "we must suppose that it was satisfied
to leave them to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the common
law."
It is of interest to compare this Supreme Court decision with Pacific S.S.
Co. v. Cackett. °. where the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held
that a passenger was not bound by a provision in a tariff, published under
the Shipping Act, requiring passenger's claims for loss or damage during
voyage to be filed within ten days of completion of the voyage. The plain-
tiff had been assaulted by an employee of the defendants while travelling
as a passenger on one of the defendants' ships. She had signed a ticket
which was given up immediately upon her embarkation and which con-
tained a clause stating that it was sold subject to the conditions of the
carrier's lawfully published tariff. The plaintiff did not file a claim within
ten days and had no knowledge of the tariff provision requiring her to
do this.
The court, citing Boston d M. R. Co. v. Hooker..7 conceded that every
passenger is chargeable with notice of everything contained in a lawfully
published tariff and that its provisions become a part of the contract of
transportation. But:
The clear purport of the decision is that a passenger or shipper is not charge-
able with notice of any regulation filed and published which is not contem-
plated or required by the Interstate Commerce Act or amendments thereto." 8
10438 Stat. 1196.
"05 258 U.S. at 25.
1068 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925); cert. denied 269 U.S. 586 (1925).
107 See supra note 46.
108 8 F.2d at 261 (1925).
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The court then held that the Act did not require or contemplate the filing
of tariffs which relate to rights of action against carriers for damage or
injuries from negligence or assault, notice of claims for such damages
having no perceptible relation to rates and charges for transportation. It
followed that since the plaintiff had no knowledge of the notice require-
ment, she was not bound by it, following the common law principle as
stated in The Majestic.
... when a company desires to impose special and most stringent terms upon
its customers in exoneration of its liability, there is nothing unreasonable in
requiring that these terms should be distinctly declared and deliberately
accepted."'
The court added that while this was conclusive of the problem, it should
be noted that such a limitation of time for presentation of a claim for
injury to a passenger, had been held void as unreasonable although printed
upon the face of the ticket. Other decisions have held longer periods
valid as reasonable, including, of course, the Gooch case.11 ° There is no
conflict with the primary jurisdiction doctrine in either case, however,
because both courts must have considered that the common law applied
to determine the validity of the tariff, Congress not having chosen to deal
with notice of claims for personal injuries.
The first case to deal specifically with the validity of notice of claim
provisions in tariffs on file with the CAB was Wilhelmy v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc.11 where the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
air carrier alleging that because of the negligent operation of the aircraft
on which she was travelling as a passenger, the aircraft had descended at
a too rapid rate resulting in injury to her inner ear and throat. The de-
fendant pleaded that her ticket contained the statement 'Sold subject to
tariff regulations' and its tariff provided that no action should be main-
tained for personal injury unless written notice of claim had been pre-
sented within thirty days after the injury was sustained and unless action
had been commenced within one year of the injury. No notice had been
given and the action was not timely. The plaintiff naturally contended
that the tariff provisions were invalid.
The district court held that the provisions were both reasonable and
valid. Beginning by pointing out that 3 0 day notice of claim requirements
had been valid in airplane passenger and other transportation,"' the court
went on to say it was governed by the rule in Jones v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc.'13 The ticket was sold subject to tariff regulations with which the
'o9 166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897).
11'Cf. The Finland, 35 F.2d 47 (E.D. N.Y. 1929). (Provision of ticket requriing notice of
claim in writing within 30 days after passenger disembarks from steamer held valid, 30 day period
not being unreasonably short). See also two cases under the Warsaw Convention: Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. N.Y. 1944). (Provision in
contract of carriage conditioning liability upon notice of claim within 30 days after origin of
the claim, held valid); Sheldon v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 74 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Sup., N.Y.
County 1947), aff'd 74 N.Y.S. 2d 267 (N.Y. Sup., App. Div. 1947). (30 day notice of claim
requirement held not inconsistent with terms of Warsaw Convention requiring action to be com-
menced within two years.)
11 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949). See also State of Maryland for use of Brandt v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 909 (D.C.-N.Y. 1948). (Motion to strike a defence that plaintiff
failed to file notice of claim within 90 days as required by carrier's tariff, denied but court gave
no reasons.)
11. See supra note 110 and the Gooch case, supra note 103.
113 See supra note 52.
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plaintiff was charged with notice. The court then held that the tariff had
been effectively filed and must be presumed to have been and remained in
effect at all times material to the action. The Cackette case was avoided
by the statement that the ten day notice of claim was, in accordance with
other decided cases, unreasonable and invalid. The court was anxious to
point out that all contract time limits for giving notice of claim or for
commencement of suit are not to be regarded as valid merely because they
are stated in the contract of transportation. The test of reasonableness had
to be met. Here the court held that the thirty day notice of claim and
one year commencement of suit requirements were reasonable and valid.
The court must have assumed that, contrary to the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act required the filing of the provisions,
otherwise the decision is clearly contrary to the Cackette case which de-
cided much more than the court was prepared to concede. It held that
passengers are not charged as a matter of law, with notice of tariffs which
are -not required to be filed with the relevant agency and the courts'
remarks with respect to the reasonableness of the tariff were obiter.
If the court in the Wilhelmy case, did make the assumption that the
provisions were statutorily authorized, it is difficult to see why they
thought it necessary to determine the provision's reasonableness in view
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. It is interesting to compare the case
with Goldsamt v. Slick Airways, Inc.,"4 where, it will be remembered, a
tariff provision concerning non-liability for delay was construed not to
mean that the defendant was free of liability for failure to deliver the
merchandise within a reasonable time. Here, the court was defining the
limits of the tariff and was not determining its reasonableness. In the
Wilheliny case, on the other hand, the court did determine the reason-
ableness of the tariff and this would appear to be inconsistent with both
the Adler and Jones cases... which introduced the primary jurisdiction
doctrine into the field of aviation.
In Meredith v. United Air Lines,11 the district court allowed a motion
to dismiss an action for personal injuries on the ground that written notice
of the claim for the injury had not been presented in writing to the general
offices of the defendant within 90 days of the alleged injury as required
by the carrier's tariffs. The court gave one reason. It was following the
Jones, Wilhelmy and Lichten cases!
There followed a series of district court decisions which refused to
follow the Wilhelmy case and declared the tariff invalid.
In Glenn v. Compania Cubana De Aviacion,"7 the court considered,
inter alia, whether a person could maintain an action for injuries against
a carrier where he had not given the thirty days notice of the claim as
required by the tariffs. The fact that the requirement was not set out on
the face of the passenger ticket served, in the opinion of the court to
distinguished the case from Gooch and other cases11 where the requirement
had been held binding upon the passenger. Even had there been adequate
notice, the court would have held, contrary to the clear holding in the
114 See supra note 80.
115 See supra notes 56 and 52.
118 [1951] U.S. Av. Rep. 103 (D. Cal. 1950).
117 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
118 See supra note 110.
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Gooch case,1 ' that since the defendants had actual notice of the occur-
rence, they were not prejudiced by failure to give such notice and
the defence as to failure to give notice would not be good under such
circumstances.
The only way to reconcile this case with the authorities dealing with
the legal effect of a properly filed tariff is to assume either that this par-
ticular tariff provision requires an exception to the general rule of con-
structive notice or that the court felt the tariff was not properly filed
under the Civil Aeronautics Act. In view of the next few cases to be
discussed, the latter explanation would appear to be the correct one.
In Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, Inc.,'" the plaintiff who was
suing for personal injuries, had failed to give notice of his claim within
ninety days of the accident as required by the carrier's tariff on file with
the CAB. He had no actual knowledge of the tariff requirement. The
defendant pleaded that his failure to give notice constituted a bar to the
action. The court held that nowhere in the Civil Aeronautics Act or the
regulations of the CAB
• . . is there any authorization or requirement for the inclusion in a tariff of
any provision respecting limitation upon notice of claim or upon the time
for commencement of actions thereon.'2 '
Then, citing the Cackette case, the court said that where a tariff pro-
vision was gratuitously inserted with respect to a matter other than that
required by an Act of Congress, a passenger or shipper is not chargeable
as a matter of law with notice of it. The reference to filed tariffs on the
ticket was not sufficient notice of the requirements at common law which
required them to be 'distinctly declared' and 'deliberately accepted' and,
therefore, the defence did not succeed.
A similar result was arrived at in Thomas v. American Air Lines, Inc.,"'
and Toman v. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc."' Both held that the Civil
Aeronautics Act does not require or authorize by implication the filing
of tariffs limiting the period for giving notice of and bringing actions
for personal injuries. In the latter case, the court also questioned whether
the CAB had the power to approve such a provision unless specifically
authorized to do so by statute.2 4 The judgments in the last three cases
were quoted extensively in Bernard v. U. S. Aircoach"'. where it was ac-
cordingly held that a tariff provision containing a ninety day notice of
claim requirement was not statutorily authorized and thus the plaintiff
was not bound by it as a matter of law.
In the same year as the latter case, 1953, the CAB itself had occasion
to determine the validity of a tariff rule which barred claims and suits for
personal injury to, or death of passengers unless written notice of the
complaint was presented to the carrier within thirty days after the alleged
129 258 U.S. at 24. "Of course, too, actual knowledge on the part of employees of the company
was not an excuse for omitting the notice in writing."
1a0 104 F. Supp. 152 (DC Cir. 1952).
"' 104 F. Supp. at 155.
122 104 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
12a 10 7 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
124 See supra note 97.
12' 117 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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occurrence of the event giving rise to the claim and unless suit was com-
menced within one year. 2 s
Under the doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction,' a district court of Florida
had postponed hearings in an action for personal injuries, to give the
plaintiffs an opportunity of seeking a finding from the Board as to the
lawfulness of the rule, thus implying, contrary to the last four cited
district court cases, that the Civil Aeronautics Act authorized the filing
of the rules.
The Board felt that there were two issues involved: "(1) whether the
rule in question was properly included in the respondent's tariff as re-
quired or authorized by section 403 of the Act and the Board's regulations
thereunder; and (2) if so, was the rule reasonable?" In view of the con-
clusion they reached with regard to the reasonableness of the rule, the
Board thought it unnecessary to determine the first issue.
They held that the rule "is and always has been unjust and unreason-
able and therefore unlawful""'  because of the general absence of such
notice rules from the tariffs of carriers in other forms of transportation,
the fact that it is inconceivable that an air carrier would not know of a
major accident to one of its planes, the presence of stewardesses and their
duty and practice of noting all injuries making it probable that the carrier
would have actual notice of even minor injuries, the maintenance of
passenger lists by all air carriers and because the rule had been used to
trap litigants and defeat the normal liability of a common carrier.
The complainants, however, had challenged the Board's authority to
find that the rule was unlawful in the past, section 1002 (d) and (e) of the
Civil Aeronautics Act contemplating decisions rendering such rules in-
operative in the future only. The Board was satisfied that it did have the
requisite authority to make a finding of past unlawfulness. It gave two
reasons for its satisfaction: section 404 (a) requires the carrier to establish
just and reasonable tariffs. Section 1002 (c) requires the Board to issue an
appropriate order if it finds that any person has failed to comply with the
Act. This section does not limit the Board's corrective action to the future.
Holding as it did that the tariff rule had always been unreasonable, it
followed that the carrier had 'failed to comply' with section 404 (a) and
any order, to have an effect in this case, had to contain a finding of past
unlawfulness.
The second and subsidiary reason was the existence of the primary juris-
diction doctrine. The issue in the Court to which the doctrine applies is
whether the tariff rule in question was reasonable at the time of the plane
crash. Were the Board to decide only whether or not the rule was reason-
able as to the present time or as to the future, that would be avoiding the
very issue which had been deferred to it for its jurisdiction and considera-
tion. In support of this reasoning, the Board noted that its staff was not
of sufficient size to examine each and every rule when filed, that the result
at which they had arrived was implicit in the earlier Adler case".. where
they had decided that the tariff in issue "was not unjust or unreasonable"
and that the Interstate Commerce Commission had for many years inter-
126 Continental Charters, Inc., Complaint of Mary Battista, et. al., 16 CAB 772 (1953). See
also 17 CAB 292 (1953).
12 16 CAB at 774.
1284 CAB 113 (1943). See supra note 69.
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preted the Motor Carrier Act as empowering them to make findings of
past unlawfulness although they had no power to award reparations as
they did have under the Interstate Commerce Act.
It is thought that this decision was a necessary one in view of the courts'
application of the 'primary jurisdiction' doctrine to tariffs on file with
the CAB and because more litigants will be encouraged to test tariffs
in this way in the hope eventually of being awarded reparations by the
courts. After all, it was a little too much to expect complainants to pro-
ceed with lengthy and expensive litigation which could only result in
"the dubious satisfaction of seeing that no one else was aggrieved by the
rule in the future.
12 9
In other respects, the decision was unfortunate or perhaps it is the ap-
plication of the primary jurisdiction doctrine which is unfortunate. As
Judge Frank said in the Lichten case,"' it results in very lengthy litigation
indeed since the Board itself has no power to award reparations. Another
point is that a finding of past unlawfulness discriminates against the many
passengers and shippers whose contracts containing the offending rule,
have already been fully performed. The decision also renders almost
nugatory, the provisions in the Act which give the Board power only to
determine whether the tariff is or will be unreasonable, etc. But such pre-
sumably is the price of uniformity and, might one say it, justice: uni-
formity, because one agency has the power to declare whether tariffs have
been, are, or will be reasonable and justice, because a sanction, albeit in-
direct, is provided against a carrier who might otherwise take advantage
of his superior bargaining power to file burdensome tariffs which are
not, at first, subject to review.
Following this decision of the CAB, four other court cases considered
the validity of passenger tariffs containing notice of claim and commence-
ment of action provisions.
In Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court of North
Carolina considered most painstakingly whether a ninety day notice of
claim requirement was authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Act and the
CAB regulations. The Cackette case had decided the rule was not au-
thorized by the Interstate Commerce Act because it had no relation to
rates and charges, but the CAB allows rules and regulations to be filed
which govern the service provided under the rates as well. The court held
that this made no difference.
The term 'service' carries with it the concept of performance and supplying
some general demand. The regulation as to time limitation to file notice of
claim and to commence action requires the carrier to do nothing. The burden
of this regulation rests entirely upon the passenger and does not seem to be
related to the transportation activities of the carrier or to the services it
performs.'
Following the Cackette case and other Supreme Court decisions,"3 the
119 Plunket, supra note, at 275.
10 Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
.. '240 N.C. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954).
12 81 S.E.2d at 184.
133 Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 445 (1926). (Government officials held not
chargeable as a matter of law with knowledge of a tariff governing the transportation of military
impedimenta, since it was not required to be filed); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Nothnagle,
346 U.S. 128 (1953).
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court then held that the plaintiff was not chargeable as a matter of law
with notice of the rule which was not authorized by the Civil Aeronautics
Act or CAB regulations. Since Congress had not occupied the field of
liability for personal injuries, the tariff limitation must yield to the con-
flicting State law which required more than constructive notice of the
tariff rule for it to be binding upon the plaintiff.
An identical result was reached in Turoff v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"34
where it was thought quite obvious that the statute does not authorize
or require the inclusion in a tariff of any provisions relating to limitations
in personal injury actions. Since the plaintiff is -not chargeable with notice
of such provisions, it had to be shown that he had 'deliberately accepted'
the provision and that the provision had been 'distinctly declared.' A
clause in the ticket stating that it was 'sold subject to tariff regulations'
was held not sufficient to satisfy these two conditions.
There followed a complete volte face. The Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit in Herman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,"' held that a pas-
senger can not bring suit for personal injuries after the time limitation
of one year stated in the carrier's properly filed tariff. Since the tariff was
properly filed, the primary jurisdiction doctrine prevented any further
consideration of the tariff's validity by the court.
The plaintiff had contended that the Board's jurisdiction only extended
to regulations which had to be filed and that this one was not authorized
since it did not affect the service the carrier provides under the prescribed
rates and tariffs. The court said that the Board's jurisdiction was not
dependent upon the carrier's duty to file the regulation with the Board
and, in any event, the Civil Aeronautics Act did require the filing of the
regulation in issue. As to the contention that the regulation did not affect
'the value of the service' the carrier performed under the rates and charges
the court said:
A passenger's action to recover damages for personal injuries, is based upon a
claim for the carrier's failure to render the agreed service, and involves 'the
value of the service', a part of which is the passenger's safe delivery at the
agreed destination. The measure of the recovery is the difference between the
safe delivery of the passenger and the actual delivery; and a regulation that
limits the time within which that claim may be asserted certainly 'affects'
the value of the recovery; the substitute for the service."'
Since the rule affected the service under prescribed rates, it followed that
it had to be filed under the Act and the CAB regulations. The court, then,
following Lichten, applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the case.
The regulation must be deemed valid until the CAB declares otherwise.
But then they added a qualification. The rule as to time of suit will only
be deemed valid if the period involved is not unreasonably short, a
qualification which would appear to infringe upon the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine as it now stands. The Civil Aeronautics Act imposes a duty
upon the carrier to file just and reasonable tariffs. Thus, any unreasonable
tariff is not statutorily authorized. However, in obedience to an excessive
desire for uniformity, the courts have held, in effect, that the CAB has
prior jurisdiction to decide whether or not a tariff has been, is, or will
134 129 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. 111. 1955).
"35222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955); cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955).
13' 222 F.2d at 327.
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be unreasonable. The appeal courts suggestion that it could declare a
time of suit limitation unreasonable is in conflict with these holdings.
The Herman case was followed in Kenney v. Northeast Airlines". where
the court preferred to follow an appellate court decision to the many
contrary district court cases. The time of suit regulation was held valid
until the Board decreed otherwise.
Before the last two cases were heard, the CAB had issued an order which
provided that the filing of tariff rules stating limitations on or conditions
to a carrier's liability for personal injury or death was no longer to be
required."' Both courts held, however, that this order was irrelevant since
the cause of action in both cases had arisen prior to the ruling by the
CAB. Also, they were not affected by the Board's decision in the Con-
tinental Charters case because, there, the CAB had passed upon the validity
of a notice of claim and not a commencement of suit requirement.
A later order of the CAB required carriers to cancel from their tariffs
all provisions stating any limitation or condition relating to carrier liability
for personal injury or death."' Notice of claim and commencement of suit
provisions are still filed with respect to baggage and goods, however.
Earlier in Migoski v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"0 the Florida Supreme
Court had held that, in order to recover damages for loss of baggage, a
passenger must comply with a tariff which required that actions for loss
of baggage be commenced within one year. No attack was made on the
validity of the tariff, however. The baggage had been lost after passengers
on an aircraft had been transferred to a bus for completion of the journey
because of inclement weather and the plaintiff had argued that the trans-
portation on the bus was a completely new undertaking quite divorced
from the original contract of carriage with the terms of which he did not
have to comply as a consequence. The court held otherwise!
The validity of a notice of claim requirement in a goods tariff was
challenged in Alco-Gravure Division etc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,''
where the plaintiff had shipped a large glass screen on the defendant's
airline and twenty four days later, when the box was opened by the con-
signee, the screen was found to be in a damaged condition. The defendant's
tariff rules required notice of claim for concealed loss or damage to be
made within fifteen days after delivery of shipment.
The district court cited section 403 of the Act and the Board's regula-
tions made pursuant thereto'42 and pointed out that the same general
subject matter had been considered, inter alia, by the Appellate Court
of the Second Circuit in Lichten and in Herman. The principle was well
established:
The carrier is obliged by the statute and regulations to file these schedules
in the first place. The Board may at once reject them as improper or unreason-
able; but if not so rejected they continue to be valid and enforceable until
the question of their alleged invalidity for unreasonableness or otherwise is
challenged by the Board or by interested parties before the Board, and held by
the Board to be invalid. In a suit against a carrier the tariff schedules must be
117 152 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
... See supra note 43.
1. See supra note 44.
14'63 So. 2d 634 (1953).
"' 173 F. Supp. 712 (D. Md. 1959).
142 See supra note 42.
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accepted and applied by the courts unless and until the Board has otherwise
ruled.'
The court then distinguished the Continental Charters decision on the
ground that it only applied to personal injuries and death. Also, all the
other contrary district court cases were decided prior to Herman and, in
any event, related only to claims by passengers, none of them involving
provisions as to timely notice of damage to cargo shipments. Then the
court decided, following Herman, that the tariff rule was within the scope
of the statute and the revised regulations of the CAB and gave judgment
for the defendant.
It is thought that apart from the confusing suggestion in Herman and
the decision in Wilhelmy implying that the courts could question the
reasonableness of a notice of claim requirement, the decisions on the tariff
rules under consideration are consistent in the methods used to determine
the validity of tariffs in general. The conflict between them turned upon
the question whether the Civil Aeronautics Act and the CAB regulations
require and authorize the filing of notice of claim and commencement of
action provisions. Now, of course, the CAB regulations expressly disallow
them with respect to claims and actions for personal injuries and death.
The Cackette case may be thought inconsistent with the decisions hold-
ing that the provisions are authorized with respect to claims and actions
for loss or damage to goods. It is submitted, however, that this is not so
since the latter decisions take account of the difference in wording between
the Interstate Commerce Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Section 6(1) of the former Act requires the filing of a "schedule of
rates, fares and charges" and the Cackette case held that notice of claim and
time of suit provisions are not matters directly related to such rates, fares
and charges.
Section 403 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, on the other hand, requires
in addition to the above, and to the extent required by the regulations of
the Board, the filing of "all classifications, rules, regulations, practices and
services in connection with such air transportation. The Algo-Gravure
and Herman cases held that notice of claim and time of suit rules are
matters affecting the services in connection with air transportation, a
different holding entirely from that in Cackette.
However, it is thought that the rules as to the effect of properly filed
tariffs should be relaxed in the case of notice of claim and time of suit
requirements. Since the burden of complying with the rules is on the
shipper, the principle of constructive notice is far too prejudicial and
rigid. The carrier should be made to bring the rules to the shipper's atten-
tion. Second, the shipper may not learn of the damage until after the
time for giving notice of his claim is passed. Therefore, the rule should
only be given effect if he knows of the damage at the time of delivery.
Finally, the rule should not be applied if the carrier is already aware of
the damage to the goods. The reason for the requirements, namely the
prevention of fraud, ceases to apply in that event.
5. Limitation of Liability for the Loss of or Damage to Baggage and Goods
The tariff rule now to be considered invariably provides that the
liability, if any, for loss or damage to baggage (goods) or for delay in
143 173 F. Supp. at 755.
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the delivery thereof, is limited to its value and, unless the passenger
(shipper) pays an additional charge therefor, the valuation shall be con-
clusively deemed not to exceed a specified sum, usually $100.
It will be noted that this type of limitation is valid at common law'"
generally, although some States have declared it invalid. 45 The situation
that arose in the Lichten case... is, therefore, unlikely to arise and there
has been little conflict in the decisions as a consequence.
The first case to consider the validity of a tariff provision of this nature
on file with the CAB was Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. United Air
Lines, Inc.4" The court gave no reasons for declaring valid a tariff limiting
liability for baggage to an agreed valuation.
In the Lichten case, it will be remembered, even the dissenting judge,
Frank, C.J., conceded that such a tariff rule was "doubtless valid."
In Radinsky v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,148 a travelling bag and its
contents which included valuable jewelry and business documents, were
lost after transportation had taken place but while still in the possession
of the defendant air carrier. There was no dispute that the tariff both
limited liability to $100, no greater value having been declared, and pro-
vided that jewelry and business documents were carried at the owner's risk.
When plaintiff's baggage was transported from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles
it was carried subject to these tariff regulations, and defendants' limited
liability for loss of, or damage to plaintiff's property thus transported.""
The court went on to say that on arrival at Los Angeles, the carrier be-
came a bailee for the accommodation of the plaintiff and in the absence of
a special contract, assumed no greater liability for loss of the baggage
than it had assumed when it transported the baggage. While not actually
saying so, the court must have assumed that the tariff rules were properly
filed with the CAB and therefore valid.
In Wadel v. American Airlines, Inc.,"' a provision in a tariff limiting
the carrier's liability for loss or destruction of baggage in the absence of
an excess value declaration was held applicable to personal property such
as jewels and furs whether or not checked as baggage. The plaintiff
had argued that the tariff, even if applicable, was invalid because it was
an attempt to limit liability for negligence. The court held that it was
valid.
As this case involves the interstate transportation of property, federal law,
not state law and policies, must govern our decision as to the validity of
tariffs or contracts limiting the carrier's liability for its negligence."'
While federal law did not allow a carrier to exempt itself from liability
for its own negligence, it did allow a carrier to limit its loss to an amount
not greater than a fixed valuation as a factor in determining the transpor-
tation rate which increases as the amount of the property risk increases.
The unusual part about this was that the court relied on the Carmack
'4See supra note 9.
145 See supra note 91.
146 See supra note 85.
147 [1951] U.S. Av. Rep. 33 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1951).
148 125 Col. 286, 242 P.2d 815 (1952).
149 242 P.2d at 816.
"0 269 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
... 269 S.W.2d at 857.
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Amendment as a declaration of the federal law generally and not just a
declaration of the federal law as applicable to railroads. As such, of course,
the case is in conflict with Lichten where the majority held that a carrier
could exclude its liability for negligence under the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Lichten was expressly followed in Wilkes v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,"'
where it was held that the defendant was only liable for the loss of a
passenger's baggage in the amount declared in its tariffs properly on file
with the CAB unless a declaration of higher value had been made and
an additional charge paid.The court cited numerous cases holding valid
similar tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
court further held, citing Lichten, that "the CAB has exclusive authority
to pass upon tariff rules filed by Interstate Carriers by Air," a statement
which is a little too wide as a description of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine. It is clear, however, that the court understood that it could
declare whether or not the tariff was authorized to be filed by the Civil
Aeronautics Act.
In S. Toepfer, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,"' two cases of sample
jewelry were lost while in possession of the defendant airline. Since the
plaintiff had declared no value, the court held he could recover no more
than the $100 provided in the tariff and added that this ". . would be
true even if the loss of the cases were occasioned by the negligence of
the carrier."
In all the above cases, the validity of the tariff in question was either
assumed or not considered by the courts. The Ohio Court of Appeal in
Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc.,"4 was the first court to fully con-
sider whether a tariff limiting liability on baggage to $100 unless excess
value had been declared and an extra charge paid, was authorized to be
filed under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the regula-
tions of the CAB. Following an extensive review of the position at com-
mon law and under the Interstate Commerce Act, the court concluded:
.. the right to so limit liability arises at common law independent of federal
statute, except as provision is made requiring the filing of tariff rates and
schedules, which, if reasonable, become binding alike upon the carrier and
its patron."'
The court agreed that there must be statutory authority for filing a
particular clause in a tariff before persons are charged with notice of it
or bound by its terms. It then held that this tariff was so authorized. In
considering the Lichten case, the court said it could well go along with
the vigorous dissenting opinion of Judge Frank but the clause there in-
volved was entirely different from the limitation clause in the instant
case and even Judge Frank had recognized the distinction between such a
clause and the one exempting the carrier from all liability. Thus, this tariff
rule was to be deemed valid until the CAB declared otherwise.
A similar rule in a cargo tariff was held valid in Rosch v. United Air
Lines, Inc."" A valuable greyhound dog was shipped by air to a certain
point and then transferred to surface transportation because of an embargo
152 288 P.2d 377 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1955).
'53 135 F. Supp. 671 (W. D. Okla. 1955).
154 144 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'5' 144 N.E.2d at 883.
'" 146 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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on air cargo shipments due to a pilots' strike. It became sick and died as
a result of the delay. The plaintiff recovered $50 instead of the actual
value of the dog which was $2,000.
It was briefly held in Tannenbaum v. National Airlines, Inc.,"' that
provisions in air carrier tariffs which limit liability for loss of baggage
are valid when such tariffs are filed with the CAB pursuant to the Civil
Aeronautics Act and that it is not necessary that a passenger's attention
be called to excess valuation provisions appearing in the ticket.
In Mustard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"8 a fur coat was lost from a coat
rack on a plane. A tariff provision limiting liability for the loss of baggage
to $100 was held valid and applicable to personal property kept in the
custody of the passenger. The court, in accordance with many authorities,
had said that the tariff rules became a part of the contract of carriage,
that their validity must be determined by federal law and that they were
binding on the passenger regardless of her lack of knowledge or of assent
to the regulation. Then the court said that there remained the question
whether the passenger had had "a fair opportunity to choose between
higher and lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser
charge" so that the carrier could lawfully limit recovery to an amount
less than the actual loss sustained. The court held that she had had that
opportunity. It will be noted that this requirement of fair opportunity
appears to be in conflict with the rule of constructive notice of tariff
provisions earlier referred to by the court. The court cited New York,
N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Notbnagle"5 in support of the requirement. This
case is thought not to be applicable since it turned upon a construction
of the Carmack Amendment which has no application to air commerce.
The Supreme Court had decided that the tariff provision limiting liability
to an agreed amount was statutorily authorized. But, under the Carmack
Amendment, the amount to which liability is to be limited, must be
declared in writing by the shipper and agreed upon in writing as the
released value of the property. On the facts, these conditions had not been
complied with and, of course, compliance with the conditions necessarily
required a knowledge of the tariff rules on the part of the plaintiff. This
explains the following remarks of the Supreme Court and distinguishes
it from the Hooker and Esteve decisions," ° which were not controlled by
the Carmack Amendment.
But only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between
higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge,
can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less than the actual loss
sustained. Binding respondent by a limitation which she had no reasonable
opportunity to discover would effectively deprive her of the requisite choice;
such an arrangement would amount to a forbidden attempt to exonerate a
carrier from the consequences of its own negligent acts.' "'
In Melnickl v. National Air Lines,' a passenger had failed to declare
a higher valuation on his baggage and pay an excess charge. In an action
". 176 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 2d 1958).
...338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (1959).
"0346 U.S. 128 (1953).
160 See supra notes 46, 47 and 49.
161 346 U.S. at 135-36.
162 150 A.2d 566 (Pa. Super. 1959).
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for loss of the baggage, the passenger argued that the tariff which limited
the carrier's liability to $100, had no effect because the loss here was the
result of the carrier's negligence. The court cited the Lichten case as
holding that the common law rule that a common carrier may not by
contract relieve itself from liability for the consequences of its own
negligence was no longer good law and that the CAB had primary re-
sponsibility for supervising rates and services.
Accordingly, this broad regulatory scheme and not the common law must
govern the contract of the parties.'63
The court therefore held the tariff valid, one of the reasons being that
the common law did not apply and yet at common law, such limitations
upon liability are valid, not being considered as clauses limiting the
carrier's liability for his own negligence.
The District Court of Michigan in Milhizer v. Riddle Airlines... con-
sidered whether a shipment of human remains fell into the same category
as the shipment of any other cargo or whether the negligence law as
applied to personal injuries or death applied. The corpse had been mutilated
in a plane crash. The court granted a motion for summary judgment in
favour of the air carrier deciding that the law with respect to loss of or
damage to freight applied. This law was federal law and under it, pursuant
to the relevant sections of the Federal Aviation Act, air carriers may limit
their liability for negligence.
In Rosenchein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,'65 the court had no diffi-
culty in finding that a tariff provision limiting liability for the loss of
baggage to $250 was valid and binding upon the passenger. Since this
was an action involving an interstate shipment of baggage, the rights
and liabilities of the parties are determined by federal law, namely the
Federal Aviation Act. Such provisions had many times been held a part
of the contract of carriage and valid and binding regardless of the
passenger's lack of knowledge or assent thereto and although the loss
occurs through the negligence of the carrier. Finally, the court said that
the cases draw a distinction between a contract immunizing a carrier
from negligence and a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valua-
tion, the latter not offending the policy of law forbidding one from
contracting against his own negligence. Such a remark would seem quite
irrelevant since the Lichten case held that under the Civil Aeronautics
Act, a carrier can limit his liability for negligence. Still it is quite clear
that the last word has not been said on the subject in view of the many
judicial comments casting doubt upon the Lichten case.
In Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'66 however, the court denied a
request by the plaintiff to reject Lichten, "this controlling decision, since
reiterated by the court of appeal for this circuit" in Herman v. North-
west Airlines.'67 The passenger's baggage containing valuable sample
jewelry was lost while in the possession of the carrier. The court allowed
the passenger to recover $100 only since he had not declared a higher
value and paid for such in accordance with the carrier's tariff provisions.
1"Id. at 568.
164 185 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd 289 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1961).
165 349 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. App. 1961).
'" 193 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
267 Supra note 135.
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The carrier had attempted to exclude his liability altogether on the ground
that its tariff also provided that it would only accept "'as baggage such
personal property as is necessary or appropriate for the wear, use, comfort
or convenience of the passenger." Since the plaintiff was a jewelry sales-
man, the court held that the jewelry he was carrying was 'necessary' and
'appropriate.'
Thus, the above cases decide that the tariff rule under discussion is
authorized by the Federal Aviation Act, formerly the Civil Aeronautics
Aviation Act, that it must be presumed valid until the CAB declares other-
wise and that federal law applies to determine its validity. In addition a
number of cases differ as to the majority ruling in the Lichten case, many
of them casting doubt upon it.
6. Disclaimer of Liability for the Negligence of Connecting Carriers
In Weeks v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 5 a dog was transported from
Burbank to Chicago by the defendant air line and then transferred to
a railway express agency for completion of the shipment to Miami. The
dog died of heat prostration suffered as a result of the negligence of the
express agency. The air carrier's tariff provided that it would not be
liable for the negligence of any other carrier or transportation organiza-
tion. The court cited numerous authorities which established the validity
of regulations adopted pursuant to the Civil Aeronautics Act and held
the provision valid.
This case concludes the consideration of the validity of tariff provisions
excluding or limiting the liability of air carriers. The conclusions stated
at the beginning of this section as to the methods used to determine the
validity of tariffs are thought to have been substantiated. It is only
necessary to point out, therefore, that, according to the decided cases, a
carrier can exclude his liability for the cancellation of flights, for changing
schedules, for delay in the delivery of freight and for the loss of certain
types of baggage even where he has been negligent. He may also disclaim
any liability he may have with respect to goods and baggage if notice of
claim and time of suit requirements have not been complied with by the
plaintiff. Finally a carrier can exclude his liability for the negligence of con-
necting carriers and limit his liability to a fixed sum for the loss of or dam-
age to goods or baggage unless a higher valuation is declared and an addi-
tional charge paid. It seems from the Lichten case that the common law
forbidding a common carrier to exempt himself from or to limit his liability
for his own negligence has no place in actions attacking the validity of
tariffs on file with the CAB unless it is shown that the tariff is not re-
quired to be filed by the Federal Aviation Act or the CAB regulations
made pursuant thereto.
It is now necessary to discuss whether the carrier by a valid tariff pro-
vision, can apply these tariff rules limiting and excluding his liability, to
his servants and agents.
IV. TARIFFS AND THE LIABILITY OF SERVANTS AND AGENTS
Two typical tariff provisions which purport to affect the liability of
servants and agents and which are on file with the CAB provide as follows:
1684 Av. Cas. 17,679 (Cal. Mun. Ct. 1955). Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Miller, 346
S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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Whenever the liability of Carrier is excluded or limited under these condi-
tions, such exclusion or limitation shall apply to agents, servants or rep-
resentatives of the Carrier and also any Carrier whose aircraft is used for
carriage and its agents, or representatives.169
and again:
The Airbill and the tariffs applicable to the shipment shall inure to the bene-
fit of and be binding upon the shipper and consignee and the carriers by whom
transportation is undertaken between the origin and destination on reconsign-
ment or return of the shipment; and shall inure also to the benefit of any
other person, firm or corporation performing for the carrier pick-up, delivery
or ground services in connection with the shipment. 7 '
Similar tariffs pertaining to air transportation have been the subject of
litigation on three occasions.
In New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Riddle Airlines,
Inc.,1 a shipment of twelve bars of dore bullion, a mixture of gold and
silver produced at the plaintiff's mines in Central America, was delivered
to T.A.N., a foreign carrier, in San Salvador, Honduras. T.A.N., the
initial carrier, transported the bullion to Miami where the defendant con-
necting and terminal carrier picked it up for transportation to New York.
Somewhere between Miami and New York half the shipment was lost.
In its contract with the initial carrier, the plaintiff had declared the value
of the whole shipment to be $100 instead of its actual value of $15,000.
According to the terms of the contract also, its provisions inured to the
benefit of the defendant as connecting and terminal air carrier. The
defendant's tariffs, however, declared that dore bullion "will be accepted
only if the actual value is declared on the airway bill at the time of
acceptance." The trial court declared this to be irrelevant since the de-
fendant was acting as agent of the initial carrier whose contract with the
plaintiff governed.
The controlling factor .. .was the contract with the initial carrier, T.A.N.,
that its provisions covered Riddle, as connecting carrier, and that a carrier
may effectively limit its liability on the basis of a reduced rate although the
shipper could have secured full protection by paying a higher rate.' 7'
On appeal, this decision was reversed and judgment entered for the
plaintiff in the full amount.1 ' It was said that, while the trial court had
properly found that the defendant deviated from its tariff provision
which provided that dore bullion would not be accepted unless its actual
value was declared and a corresponding rate paid, it erred when it went
on to find that, notwithstanding this fact, the released value fixed in the
airway bill inured to the benefit of the defendant as an agent of the
original carrier or as a connecting carrier. The main reason was that
.19 Local & Joint Air Cargo Tariff, No. CR-3, rule 15 (L) issued by R. C. Lounsbury, Agent:
September 20, 1960.
170 Official Air Freight Rules Tariff, No. 1-A, rule no. 3.1 issued by B. H. Smith, Agent:
March 2, 1961. Cf. International Airfreight Rate Tariff No. l-D, rule no. 40(4) issued by
James J. McNulty: August 31, 1961: "Whenever the liability of Forwarder is excluded or limited
under these conditions, such exclusions or limitation shall apply to agents, servants, or representa-
tives of the Forwarder."
171 152 N.Y.S.2d 753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
172 Id. at 75 5.
"3162 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 2d 1957); aff'd 172 N.Y.S.2d 168, 149 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1958).
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Riddle was prohibited by section 403 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act from
accepting a lower rate than that specified in its currently effective tariffs.
The court added that T.A.N.'s tariff could inure to Riddle only if an
interline agreement, properly filed with the CAB under section 412 (a) of
the Act, was in existence between the two carriers.
It is clear from this case, however, that it is possible for the conditions
and limitations in a contract with one carrier to inure to the benefit of
connecting carriers. This is no more than the Supreme Court has itself
decided on several occasions and it is evident from Cleveland, C.C. 0
St. L.R. Co. v. Dettlebach"' why it has been so decided.
Goods were lost after their transportation by the connecting carrier
but while in his possession as warehouseman. The problem was whether
the limitation of liability to an agreed value in the contract with the
initial carrier inured to the benefit of the defendant as warehouseman,
not as connecting carrier. The state court had decided in the negative
since there was no consideration supplied for the limitation of liability in
the way of reduced charges for storage of the goods. In its capacity as
connecting carrier, there was consideration since the transportation rates
had been reduced. The Supreme Court regarded this reason as cogent thus
indicating that there is a contractual relationship between connecting
carrier and shipper. Nevertheless, the court said the question was federal
in nature and that Congress in the Interstate Commerce Act and especially
in the amendment of June 29, 1906,'17' had made it clear that the termt transportation" was to include a variety of services that, according to
the common law, were separable from carrier's service as carrier. Thus the
services provided by the carrier as warehouseman were subject to the same
conditions and limitations in his contract of carriage with the shipper, as
the services provided by him as carrier, and the valuation placed upon the
property applied to his responsibility as warehouseman.
It is evident that the theory upon which a connecting carrier is allowed
to take the benefit of conditions and limitations in the shippers' contract
with the initial carrier is that the initial carrier is contracting on behalf
of all connecting carriers who are, as a consequence, parties to the contract
of carriage. Thus, in the Honduras case, the carrier was forbidden to enter
into the contract because the Civil Aeronautics Act declares unlawful
any agreement which is inconsistent with filed tariffs. There was no
question of agency. In fact the appeal court said that the trial court had
erred in suggesting that Riddle was an agent of T.A.N. Similarily, in
the Dettlebach case, the state court had held that the carrier as warehouse-
man could not be considered a party to the contract which limited his
liability since he had supplied no consideration in return for such limita-
tion. The Supreme Court held, on the other hand, that the services pro-
vided by carrier were to be considered among the services he contracted
to provide in the contract of transportation for which there was considera-
tion. This result was necessitated by the policy of Congress.
In Twentieth Century Delivery Service, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance, Co.,17 a delivery service was held entitled to the benefits of the
174 239 U.S. 588 (1916). Cf. Kansas City So. R.R. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1913) and Georgia,
F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Mining Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916).
17' The Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584.
"o 242 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1957); mod., 242 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1957).
TARIFF LIMITATIONS
limitation of liability expressly extended to it in the tariffs and, there-
fore, in the contract of carriage between the shipper and air carrier. A
coffee machine was negligently damaged by the appellants while delivering
it pursuant to a transportation contract between Trans World Airlines
and the insured consignor. The airway bill contained a provision declaring
that the shipment was subject to governing classifications and tariffs
filed in accordance with law. One tariff provision provided for a limi-
tation of liability to an assumed value unless a higher value was declared
and applicable charges paid thereon. Another declared that these tariff
provisions inured to the benefit of, or applied to "any other person
performing for the carrier, such pick-up, delivery or ground service in
connection with the shipment." The appellants argued that this provision
enabled them to take advantage of the limitation of liability since they
had a contract with T.W.A. whereby they undertook to perform the
ground delivery services referred to in the tariff.
Citing section 403 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act,1" the court said that
the extension of the tariff to persons performing delivery services "is an
exercise of the authority thus granted to classify and regulate 'services
in connection with such air transportation.' ..... Also the CAB regulations
required the filing of all ". . . provisions governing terminal services and
all other services ... in connection with air transportation..... It followed
that these tariffs were statutorily authorized:
• .. the Board was expressly authorized by Congress to permit and approve
the filing of such tariffs."'
And the primary jurisdiction doctrine prevented any further considera-
tion of the validity of the tariffs, since properly filed tariffs are deemed
valid until rejected by the CAB.
The court was encouraged by the fact that analagous situations had
arisen in respect to other carriers and similar results had been reached. It
quoted extensively from Collins & Co. v. Panama R. Co."' and United
States v. The South Star,"' both of which have since been overruled by the
Supreme Court in Krawill Machinery Corp. v. Herd."' However, this
case can be distinguished on the ground that the bills of lading, unlike
the airway bill and the tariffs in the present case, did not expressly extend
to the defendants, the benefit of the limitation of liability upon which
they were attempting to rely. That this was considered a relevant and
important fact by the Supreme Court can be seen from many passages
in the judgment.184
More in point was Northern Fur Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &' S.S. M.R.
Co.,8 where furs were delivered to a railway express company for
delivery to New York. The receipt contained an express provision that
its terms should inure to the benefit of "all carriers handling the ship-
ment." One of its terms limited recovery for loss to the value declared.
177 See supra note 31.
178 242 F.2d at 296.
171 See supra note 42.
18 242 F.2d at 297.
.1 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
12210 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1954).
"3a359 U.S. 297 (1959).
184 Ibid.
"5224 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1955).
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The furs were lost as a result of the negligence of the defendant railway
company over whose lines the shipment was passing under an arrange-
ment between the defendants and the Express Company. The court held
that the defendant railway company was entitled to the benefit of the
limitation of liability clause notwithstanding that it had no direct dealings
with the shipper. The court also decided that it made no difference whether
the company was an independent contractor or an agent of the Express
Company. The following passage in the judgment of the Twentieth
Century case includes a verification of this fact:
The body of law governing all liabilities arising out of the arrangement
represented by this air-bill, and the shipment there called for, was within
the power of Congress to enact. Here the legislative scheme has provided
through statute and the regulations there authorized the extent of Twentieth
Century's liability. Hence, here .... it does not matter that Twentieth Cen-
tury is not a formal party to the bill of lading. For this reason, it is of no
importance whether as between Trans World and Twentieth Century the
latter was an independent contractor, an agent, or an employee of Trans
World .. .the whole matter is beside the point for the reason that the tariff
rules and regulations expressly applied to Twentieth Century, whatever its
capacity may have been. 8'
This is probably the most important passage in the judgment and
indicates that, under federal law, servants and agents can rely on tariff
provisions which extend to them the benefits of all conditions and
limitations on the carrier's liability.
In Globe d Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Airborne Flower & Freight
Trafic, Inc., 7 a California court held that a similar intrastate tariff
provision did not apply to an independent contractor. A shipment of
furs, valued in the airbill at $50, was shipped by United Air Lines from
Los Angeles to San Francisco. The defendant trucking firm then collected
the furs for delivery to the insured consignee. One carton of furs valued
at $11,755 was then lost by them. The sole issue was whether the de-
fendant could rely on the provisions of the airbill limiting liability to
the declared value of $50 and providing that this limitation inured to
the benefit of any other person performing for the carrier delivery service
in connection with the shipment. These rules were contained in United
Air Lines Intrastate Tariffs on file with the California Public Utilities
Commission. The court thought that to "bring itself within the terms
of the tariff, the defendant must show that it performed the delivery
service for United." They then held that, on the evidence, the defendant
was not an agent of United and was handling the shipment as carrier
for hire on its own account as an independent contractor. The case was
to be distinguished from the Twentieth Century decision, said the court,
but it is not clear why. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that, in
the Twentieth Century case,
the airbill executed between the shipper and the carrier included charges
for the delivery of the shipment and the tariff was construed to include the
defendant within its coverage...
... 242 F.2d at 299.
18749 Cal. 2d 38, 314 P.2d 741 (1957).
"s8 314 P.2d at 743.
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No delivery charges were stated on the airbill in the present case and
the defendant billed the shipper directly for its services. In other words,
there was a distinct contract between the shipper and defendant which
was quite unconnected with the air transportation and in which no limi-
tation of liability according to declared value, was provided for. This is
all very reminiscent of the State court decision, subsequently reversed by
the Supreme Court, in the Dettlebach case.18 The case was, of course,
governed by California law and largely turned upon a question of fact:
was the delivery service performed for the carrier? In any event, had the
defendant been an agent or servant of United, it is clear that the court
would have held that the limitation of liability inured to its benefit.
Thus, it can be concluded that the tariffs on file with the CAB are
statutorily authorized and any conditions and limitations on liability
therein inure to the benefit of the servants and agents of the carrier.
V. CONCLUSION
There is Federal Court of Appeal authority for the proposition that
tariffs extending the benefit of conditions and limitations on the carrier's
liability to his servants and agents are statutorily authorized and as such
valid until the CAB declares otherwise. The only consideration necessary
then is whether any given tariff limiting or conditioning the liability of
the carrier is valid. Since rules affecting the liability of carriers for per-
sonal injury or death are disallowed, limitations on liability are only
found with respect to the carriage of baggage and goods. A careful
reading of domestic tariffs will show that none of them expressly limits
or excludes liability for negligence. However, a few, such as the notice
of claim and commencement of action provisions, have the effect of
doing so. Until and unless the Lichten and Herman cases are overruled,
there is Federal Court of Appeal authority for the proposition that such
tariffs are statutorily authorized and therefore valid, any common or State
law rule to the contrary notwithstanding.
189 See supra note 174.
